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1 Introduction
According to Herbert Simon (1955),
in most global models of rational choice, all alternatives are eval-
uated before a choice is made. In actual human decision-making,
alternatives are often examined sequentially. We may, or may
not, know the mechanism that determines the order of procedure.
When alternatives are examined sequentially, we may regard the
first satisfactory alternative that is evaluated as such as the one
actually selected.
The ‘satisficing’ heuristic assumes that the decision-maker discovers and
analyses alternatives sequentially and, rather than performing a complicated
calculation to derive the optimal stopping rule, follows a simple procedure:
if you are satisfied with the current alternative stop, if not keep searching.
Once you stop, choose the best discovered alternative (Simon, 1955).1
I propose a simple market model in which two profit-maximizing firms
producing a homogeneous good compete on prices for a satisficing consumer
and influence his aspiration price (the price regarded as satisfactory) via
marketing.2 This research question is relevant for several reasons. First, de-
spite the importance of the satisficing theory, little consideration has been
devoted to its implications within an industrial organization setting. This
study complements the growing behavioural industrial organization litera-
ture (Spiegler, 2011). Second, there is experimental evidence supporting the
hypothesis that decision-makers behave according to the satisficing heuris-
tic (Caplin, Dean and Martin, 2011; Reutskaja et al., 2011). In addition,
1The version of the satisficing heuristic studied here is called best-satisficing in the
sense that if the decision-maker does not find any satisfactory product, then he buys
the best unsatisfactory one among those discovered. Alternatively, last-satisficing implies
that if no satisfactory product is identified, the decision-maker buys the last discovered
product (e.g. see Rubinstein and Salant (2006)). A third possibility is that if there is no
satisfactory product, the consumer chooses nothing (he postpones). In a market context,
best-satisficing is a plausible assumption in the circumstances in which the consumer
urgently needs a product.
2The assumption firms are able to manipulate the primitives of the consumer’s choice
procedure is standard in the behavioural industrial organization literature (e.g. see Eliaz
and Spiegler (2011)).
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theorists that have recently studied the choice-theoretic foundations of the
satisficing heuristic have provided a deeper understanding of its behavioural
implications (Rubinstein and Salant, 2006; Caplin and Dean, 2011; Papi,
2012).3 Third, investigating the interplay between marketing and prices in
real-world markets has recently attracted attention (Bertrand et al., 2010;
Agarwal and Ambrose, 2011; Gurun, Matvos and Seru, 2016).
In the proposed market model there are two firms that, along with a price,
choose between a high or a low ‘marketing signal’. If both firms choose a high
(resp., low) marketing signal, then the consumer’s aspiration price is assumed
to increase (resp., decrease), where an increase in the aspiration price makes
the consumer more ‘satisficing’ and reduces his willingness to search (and
vice versa). On the other hand, if firms choose different marketing signals,
then the consumer makes a price comparison if and only if the price that
the default firm charges exceeds a firm-specific intermediate aspiration price.
Firms therefore face a trade-off between, on the one hand, increasing the
aspiration price as much as possible in order to reduce search and charge the
highest possible price and, on the other hand, reducing the aspiration price to
induce a price comparison and undercut the opponent. The main innovation
of the model is that, unlike in the recent models of price-frame competition
(Carlin, 2009; Piccione and Spiegler, 2012; Chiovenau and Zhou, 2013; Gu
and Wenzel, 2014), whether the consumer makes a price comparison depends
upon both marketing and pricing strategies.
In this framework marketing is interpreted to be persuasive in the sense
that it is aimed at affecting the consumer’s aspiration price.4 For example, a
firm can increase the consumer’s aspiration price by advertising dominated
products along with the target product that it intends to sell. If the consumer
- along with the target product (say, a bicycle with certain features) - is shown
a second product which is dominated by the target product (e.g. a bicycle
of lower quality), then the consumer’s desirability for the target product
increases. This phenomenon - known as attraction effect - is well-documented
3For instance, a satisficing decision-maker’s choice behaviour is irrational from a re-
vealed preference’s viewpoint if and only if either the ordering according to which he
examines the alternatives or his aspiration level are not fixed.
4See Bagwell (2007) for a review of the economic literature on advertising.
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in the marketing literature (Ratneshwar, Shocker and Stewart, 1987). Hence,
one could interpret the high (resp., low) marketing signal as ‘advertising
(resp., not advertising) a dominated product’. A second example is given
by firms making announcements about product availability (e.g. ‘Hurry up,
we are running out of stock’). Recent marketing research has shown that
‘advertisement with a scarcity stimulus can increase perception and purchase
intentions for the advertised product’ (Nichols, 2017).
In section 3 I fully characterise the unique symmetric equilibrium by
showing that firms randomise over both prices and marketing signals in
equilibrium. Unlike in price-frame competition models, the pricing strat-
egy consists of a mixture distribution that contains a gap in the support
located just above an intermediate aspiration price. Moreover, the presence
of satisficing consumers allows firms to earn extra profits above the max-min
level and, unlike most standard models of search, the proposed framework
displays equilibrium search.
The paper has two main findings. First, the model predicts that con-
ditional on sending out a low (resp., high) signal, firms charge on average
a relatively low (resp., high) price. That is, there is a positive correlation
between marketing and prices in equilibrium. This finding can help explain
some recent empirical evidence on the relationships between advertising and
prices. E.g. Gurun, Matvos and Seru (2016) study the US mortgage market
and find that lenders that advertise more intensively are able to sell more
expensive mortgages. Gurun, Matvos and Seru (2016) argue that their empir-
ical results reject traditional models of informative advertising and, instead,
are more consistent with a persuasive view of advertising, where - like in the
proposed model - the heterogeneity in the degree of consumer sophistication
plays a crucial role.5 Other studies that document a relationship between
advertising and prices include Agarwal and Ambrose (2011) and Bertrand
5In models of price-frame competition in which one frame is unambiguously more com-
plex than the other, firms charge a higher (resp., lower) price conditional on choosing
a complex (resp., simple) frame (Chiovenau and Zhou, 2013). However, in those mod-
els marketing is not interpreted to be persuasive, but consists of framing decisions (e.g.
choosing a simple vs a complex fee structure).
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et al. (2010).6
Second, in standard search models an increase in the consumer’s propen-
sity to search (i.e., a decrease in the search cost) leads to a decrease in the
consumer’s reservation price and, as a result, affects the equilibrium price
distribution accordingly (Stahl, 1989).7 In this model, on the contrary, an
actual increase in the consumer’s equilibrium search may not have any effect
on the equilibrium price and marketing strategies. The reason is that, un-
like in standard search frameworks, in this model the consumer disregards
the equilibrium price distribution when computing his search strategy.8 This
novel result can help explain why - despite there have been advancements in
the search technology that have facilitated search, such as the arrival of the
internet - price dispersion has endured (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Baye,
Morgan and Scholten, 2004): the internet has induced consumers to search
more, but firms have only partially reacted by changing their pricing strategy
accordingly, because a fraction of consumers do not search optimally.9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Subsection 1.1 re-
views the related literature; Section 2 introduces the formal model; Section 3
presents the equilibrium analysis; Section 4 proposes the comparative statics
analysis; Section 5 concludes. The proofs of lemma 1 and proposition 1 are
relegated in the appendix. Further details and the proofs of the corollar-
ies can be found in the supplementary material, which is available from the
author upon request.
6See also Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2010) for a review of the literature investigating
how persuasion affects consumer choice.
7This is true if the search cost is not too high. Moreover, note that in standard search
models like Stahl (1989) there is no equilibrium search.
8I explain the intuition behind this result in the comparative statics section. I also
discuss the relationship between satisficing and standard models of search in the literature
review section.
9The literature has offered several explanations of this phenomenon, such as supply-
side bounded rationality (Baye and Morgan, 2003), loyalty to a brand name (Chen and
Hitt, 2003), obfuscation (Ellison and Ellison, 2009). See also Pan, Ratchford and Shankar
(2004) for a review on this subject.
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1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to the behavioural industrial organization literature on
price-frame competition.10 Varian (1980) assumes that firms simultaneously
compete on price for a consumer that is shopper and uninformed with posi-
tive probability.11 Both Carlin (2009) and Chiovenau and Zhou (2013) extend
Varian (1980) by assuming that the fraction of shoppers and uninformed con-
sumers is endogenously determined. In Carlin (2009)’s model along with a
price firms choose its complexity and it is assumed that more complex price
structures reduce the fraction of shoppers.12 On the other hand, Chiovenau
and Zhou (2013) assume that firms can manipulate the extent to which con-
sumers are informed by framing their products in a certain way and, unlike
in Carlin (2009), in their model how a firm’s frame influences the extent
to which a price comparison is made depends upon the competitors’ frame
decisions. Finally, Piccione and Spiegler (2012) focus their attention on the
two-firm case by considering a more general framework than Chiovenau and
Zhou (2013).13 Unlike all these studies, my model assumes that whether
a price comparison is made or not, depends on both pricing and marketing
strategies.
The proposed model can also be viewed as a standard search model with
two special features that have been investigated separately in the literature.
First, like in the literature on obfuscation (Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012), firms
are able to manipulate the perceived search costs of the consumers via obfus-
cation strategies.14 Second, the consumer does not consider the equilibrium
price distribution when computing his search strategy (see e.g. Parakho-
nyak (2014)) and, instead, merely compares the perceived search cost with
10Recent surveys of the behavioural industrial organization literature include Ellison
(2006), Armstrong (2008), and Spiegler (2011).
11Actually Varian (1980) is considered to be a model of standard industrial organization.
However, I discuss it here for expositional purposes.
12See also Gu and Wenzel (2014) that consider a two-stage game in which firms first
choose the obfuscation levels and then the prices. In their model the obfuscation strate-
gies influence the fraction of sophisticated (i.e., shoppers) and naive (i.e., uninformed)
consumers in the population.
13See Spiegler (2014) for an extension.
14See also Armstrong and Zhou (2016) that assumes that firms can deter search by
charging higher prices to returning costumers.
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the price charged by the default firm.15 The latter is consistent with the
bounded rationality tradition, according to which, while the fully rational
consumer has the cognitive capacity to figure out the equilibrium price dis-
tribution and calculate the optimal stopping rule, the boundedly rational one
does not (or is not willing to) and, as a result, uses simple rules of thumb to
make decisions.16
An interesting work is Chen and Zhang (2011) that studies a price-
competition model with three types of consumers: shopper, uninformed, and
- what they call - global searcher. A global searcher is a fully rational con-
sumer that searches optimally a` la Stahl (1989). Under certain conditions on
their parameters, which I will discuss below, they too find that the support
of the price distribution contains a gap and there may be equilibrium search.
However, their model is different from mine in two respects. First, their
consumers are fully rational. Second, the consumer types are exogenous.
Finally, a recent study by de Cippel, Eliaz and Rozen (2014) also has the
feature that the consumer’s decision of whether to explore the competitor
depends on whether the default charges a price below some threshold. How-
ever, their model is different from mine, as they assume that fully rational
consumers have to decide how to allocate a limited budget of attention to
multiple markets.
2 The Model
I assume that there are two profit-maximizing firms that produce a homo-
geneous good at zero costs. Each firm simultaneously chooses a price in
the interval [0, 1] and decides whether to send out either a low (s = 0) or
15Parakhonyak (2014) argues that it is unrealistic to assume that the consumer knows
(or is able to calculate) in advance the equilibrium price distribution. In his model a
fraction of consumers are shoppers and a fraction of them disregard the equilibrium price
distribution and derive a stopping rule that satisfies certain consistency requirements.
Unlike Parakhonyak (2014), my consumers follow a simple rule of thumb.
16This second aspect captures the main difference between the satisficing and the stan-
dard approach: unlike in standard search models, in satisficing models the stopping rule is
not necessarily optimal. Empirically, one would distinguish between the two approaches
by checking whether the consumer searches more or less with respect to what would be
the optimal amount of search.
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a high (s = 1) marketing signal. Formally, a firm strategy is denoted by
(p, s) ∈ [0, 1] × {0, 1}. Marketing is interpreted as persuasive in the sense
that it is aimed at affecting the consumer’s aspiration price. As discussed
in the introduction, examples include advertising dominated products and
making announcements about product availability.
I assume that there is one consumer assigned to firm 1 and firm 2 with
equal probability.17 That is, I assume two equally likely states of the world:
one in which the consumer’s default is firm 1 and one in which it is firm 2.18
His maximum willingness to pay for the product is normalized to 1. If each
firm sends out a low signal, then the consumer is a shopper, in the sense that
he inspects both firms regardless of the marking signals (i.e., his aspiration
price is always 0); if each firm sends out a high signal, the consumer is
uninformed in the sense that he stops searching at the default firm regardless
of the priced charged (i.e., his aspiration price is 1)19; if firms send out
different signals, then the consumer is a conditional shopper in the sense
that he stops searching at the default firm if and only if the price that the
default charges is smaller than or equal to an intermediate aspiration price
that depends upon the identity of the firm that sends out the high signal: if
the default firm sends out a high signal and the competitor a low signal, then
the aspiration price is equal to α ∈ (0, 1). On the contrary, if the default firm
sends out a low signal and the competitor a high signal, then the aspiration
price is equal to β, where α ≥ β > 0. The assumption that α ≥ β is meant
to capture the idea that the default firm’s marketing has a stronger influence
on the consumer relative to the competitor’s.20 The consumer is assumed to
17An equivalent interpretation is that there is a unit mass of consumers, half of which
are assigned to firm 1 and half to firm 2.
18This assumption is borrowed from Piccione and Spiegler (2012).
19The terminology ‘shopper’ and ‘uninformed’ is standard in the literature and here it
is used accordingly. To see that ‘shopper’ and ‘uninformed’ are special cases of satisficing,
let L ≡ 〈p1, p2, . . . , pn〉 be a list of n prices and p¯ be the consumer’s aspiration price.
According to the definition provided above, the satisficing consumer explores the list L
of prices sequentially and stops searching as soon as he finds a p that is smaller than or
equal to p¯. Notice that if p¯ is sufficiently low (resp., high), then the consumer always
explores the whole list L (resp., only the first element of the list L), which corresponds to
the search behaviour of a shopper (resp., an uninformed). E.g. see Papi (2012).
20Notice that α and β capture an aspect of the consumer’s bounded rationality and,
therefore, are not necessarily related with a measure of consumer satisfaction.
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purchase from the cheapest firm discovered and ties are randomly broken.
Denote by ai(s1, s2) the consumer’s aspiration price when the default
firm is firm i as defined in the previous paragraph. Firm i’s profit function
is defined as follows.
pii((pi, si), (pj, sj)) ≡

pi if pi < pj and pj > aj(s1, s2)
pi
2
if pi = pj or pk ≤ ak(s1, s2) for all k ∈ {1, 2}
0 otherwise
Firm i gets all market shares (pi) with probability one whenever it is
cheaper than firm j (pi < pj) and the consumer assigned to firm j finds its
price unsatisfactory (pj > aj(s1, s2)). The latter implies that in the state of
the world in which the consumer is assigned to firm j, he realizes that the
default firm charges an unsatisfactory price, inspects firm i, and finds out
that it is cheaper. On the other hand, firms obtain all market shares with
equal probability (pi
2
) whenever they either charge the same price (pi = pj)
or a satisfactory price (pk ≤ ak(s1, s2) for all k ∈ {1, 2}). If both firms charge
a satisfactory price, then there is no search and the consumer sticks to the
default firm in all states of the world. Finally, in all the other cases, firm i
gets zero market shares (0).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
I begin with a preliminary observation.
Lemma 1. There is no equilibrium in which firms choose marketing signals
deterministically.
Lemma 1 implies that firms choose both marketing signals with strictly
positive probability in equilibrium. This means that the consumer is shop-
per, uninformed, and conditional shopper with positive probability. Hence,
standard arguments imply that there is no equilibrium in which firms choose
the price deterministically. Therefore, in equilibrium firms randomize over
both marketing and price.
Throughout I denote a symmetric mixed-strategy by σ ≡ 〈λ(s), (F s)s∈{0,1}〉,
where λ(s) is the probability that the marketing signal s is sent out and F s
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is the cdf pricing strategy conditional on the firm sending out signal s. For
compactness, I slightly abuse notation by writing λ (resp., 1− λ) instead of
λ(0) (resp., λ(1)).
As an illustration assume that a firm i chooses the pure strategy (p, s) =
(p, 1) with β < p < α against the other firm choosing some mixed strategy
σ.21 Then, firm i’s profits are
pi((p, 1), σ) = p
(
λ
(
1
2
+
1− F 0(p)
2
)
+
1− λ
2
)
(1)
The interpretation is that when firm j sends out a low signal, which occurs
with probability λ, the consumer is a conditional shopper and his aspiration
price is equal to α (resp., β) whenever his default firm is firm i (resp., j).
Since the price that firm i charges is lower than α, then in the state of the
world in which the default firm is firm i (which occurs with probability 1/2),
he stops searching at firm i and buys from it, as its price is satisfactory. On
the contrary, in the state of the world in which the default firm is firm j -
given that the price charged by i is unsatisfactory - he purchases from firm
i if and only if the price that firm j charges is greater than that charged by
i, which occurs with probability 1− F 0(p). On the other hand, when firm j
sends out a high signal, which occurs with probability 1−λ, the consumer is
uninformed and his aspiration price is equal to 1. In this case the consumer
shops randomly. So overall firm i’s profits are given by the price p it charges
times the probability that the consumer buys firm i’s product.
Lemma 2. The max-min payoff of the game that models the market under
consideration is α
2
.
Assume that a firm i chooses (p, s) = (α, 1). Independently of how the
other firm responds, the consumer’s aspiration price is either α when firm i is
the default firm (if firm j chooses s = 0) or 1 (if firm j chooses s = 1). Hence,
by charging at most α, firm i ensures that in the state of the world in which
the consumer is assigned to it, he will stop searching at firm i and buy its
product. This implies that firm i makes at least α
2
profits. Firm i can possibly
make higher profits in the case firm j charges an unsatisfactory price with
21For the sake of the illustration I assume that F 0 is atomless. This property turns out
to hold in equilibrium.
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some probability, but this will not happen under the max-min assumption.
It follows that the unique max-minimizer is (α, 1) and the corresponding
max-min payoff is α
2
.
Lemma 2 has got strong implications on the equilibrium analysis. In par-
ticular it entails that the minimum level of profits that a firm can guarantee
in equilibrium is positive and equal to α
2
.
The equilibrium pricing and marketing strategies turn out to be different
depending on whether α is greater or smaller than a threshold. I examine
both cases in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium σ such that
 if α < 2
3
,
 λ = 2−α
2+3α
 F 0(p) =

0 if p < α
1+α
2(1+α)
2−α − 2α(2−α)p if p ∈
[
α
1+α
, α
)
2α
2−α if p ∈
[
α, 2α
2−α
)
2+α
2−α − 2α(2−α)p if p ∈
[
2α
2−α , 1
)
1 otherwise
 F 1 consists of two atoms of equal size located at α and 1.
 and if α ≥ 2
3
,
 λ = 1− α
 F 0(p) =

0 if p < α
3−2α
3−2α
2(1−α) − α2(1−α)p if p ∈
[
α
3−2α , α
)
1 otherwise
 F 1 consists of two atoms located at α and 1 of size 2α−1
α
and 1−α
α
,
respectively.
Proposition 1 possesses multiple noteworthy properties. First, the equi-
librium marketing and pricing strategies are independent of β. This implies
that the extent to which the competitor’s influence on the consumer’s as-
piration price is close to the default firm’s is irrelevant. So no matter how
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influential the competitor is, as long as β ≤ α the size of β does not have any
effect on the equilibrium. This result turns out to have novel implications
on the relationship between the consumer’s search behaviour and the firms’
equilibrium strategies that I will discuss in the comparative statics section.
Second, the equilibrium probability that firms send out a high signal
is increasing in α. That is, a higher conditional shopper’s aspiration price
induces firms to enhance marketing.
-
F 0
-
F 1
0
t
α
1+α
d
t
α
t
2α
2−α
d
t
1
Figure 1: The support of F 0 and F 1 when α < 2
3
Third, figure 1 graphically represents the support of F 0 and F 1 under
the assumption that α < 2
3
. Conditional on s = 0, firms randomize over
the price according to an atomless cdf. This follows from the fact that,
conditional on s = 0, the consumer is a shopper with positive probability
in every realization. The support of F 0 consists of the union of two disjoint
intervals located just below the aspiration prices α and 1. As α increases,
2α
2−α converges to 1 and becomes equal to it as α meets the threshold
2
3
.
As soon as that occurs, the right portion of the support of F 0 disappears,
which corresponds to the second case of proposition 1. On the other hand,
conditional on sending out a high signal, firms charge two prices - α and
1 - with positive probability. The intuition behind this result is three-fold.
First, conditional on sending a high signal, it does not make sense for a firm
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i to charge a price strictly below α, because in the worst case (when firm
j chooses s = 0) the consumer’s aspiration price is α in the state of the
world in which the consumer is assigned to i. Second, as it will become
clear below, increasing the price from α to a price above α conditional on
sending out a high signal reduces market power, because the prices above α
are unsatisfactory when firms send out different signals. Third, conditional
on sending a high signal, the market shares that a firm obtains when the
other firm sends out a high signal as well are independent of the price that
firm i charges. The reason is that when both firms send out a high signal
the consumer is uninformed implying that he sticks to the default regardless
of the price they charge. This induces firms to charge the highest possible
price.
Fourth, in terms of the relationship between F 0 and F 1, it turns out that
F 1 first-order stochastically dominates F 0 if and only if α ≥ 2
5
.22 The latter
indicates that there is a strong correlation between prices and marketing in
equilibrium. I will further develop this discussion in the comparative statics
section.
Fifth, there exists a price interval just above α to which both F 0 and
F 1 assign zero mass. The reason is that by increasing the price from α to a
price above α there is a discontinuity in profits, as firms suddenly lose market
power. To gain an intuition of why this is the case I now compute a firm i’s
expected profits of choosing (p′, 1) with p′ > α against some mixed-strategy
σ.
pi((p′, 1), σ) = p′
(
λ(1− F 0(p′)) + (1− λ)
2
)
(2)
By comparing the above expected profits (eq.(2)) with the expected prof-
its of choosing the strategy (p, 1) with β < p < α (see eq. (1)), it can be
seen that there is a difference in the realization in which firm j sends out
a low signal. In particular as long as firm i charges a price at most equal
to α, it guarantees that in the state of the world in which the consumer is
assigned to it, the conditional shopper stops searching at firm i, as its price
22When α ≥ 23 , then necessarily F 1 first-order stochastically dominates F 0. When
α < 23 , F
1 first-order stochastically dominates F 0 if and only if F 0(α) = 2α2−α >
1
2 = F
1(α).
That is, α ≥ 25 .
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is satisfactory, regardless of the price charged by firm j. On the contrary, as
soon as firm i increases its price above α, it makes its price unsatisfactory
implying that in the state of the world in which the consumer is assigned to
firm i, the conditional shopper will inspect firm j. For a sufficiently small
 > 0, this discontinuity in profits implies that an increase in the price from
α to α +  does not offset the reduction in market shares.
One of the few models in the literature whose equilibrium pricing strategy
also displays a gap in the support is Chen and Zhang (2011) discussed above.
Their model generates a price distribution with a gap only if the shopper’s
reservation price exceeds by a relatively large amount the global searcher’s
reservation price at a benchmark case - i.e., when the consumer is either a
shopper or a global searcher (and never an uninformed consumer).
4 Comparative Statics
4.1 Average Price and Profits
Corollary 1. In equilibrium
 Conditional on s=0, each firm charges on average
 2α
2−α
(
ln(1 + α)− ln ( 2α
2−α
))
, if α < 2
3
 α
2(α−1)
(
ln
(
1
3−2α
))
, otherwise.
 Conditional on s=1, each firm charges on average
 1+α
2
, if α < 2
3
 2α + 1
α
− 2, otherwise.
 Firm’s profits are
 2α
2+3α
, if α < 2
3
 α
2
, otherwise.
Figure 2 graphically represents the conditional average prices. Both aver-
age prices are increasing in α. A decrease in α makes the conditional shopper
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Figure 2: Average Price Conditional on s = 0 (Solid Line) and on s = 1
(Dashed Line)
more and more similar to a shopper leading to an increase in competition
and lower prices. Except in the extreme case in which the conditional shop-
per becomes uninformed (i.e., α = 1), there is a positive correlation between
marketing and prices in equilibrium in the sense that conditional on sending
out a high (resp., low) signal firms charge on average a relatively high (resp.,
low) price. This result is intuitive, because, unlike a low marketing signal,
a high signal increases the consumer’s aspiration price, reduces his willing-
ness to search, and, as a result, makes the market relatively less competitive,
which in turn leads firms to charge higher prices. As discussed in the intro-
duction, this finding can help explain the interaction between marketing and
prices detected in some real-world markets (Gurun, Matvos and Seru, 2016).
Equilibrium profits are depicted in figure 3. Notice that an increase in
α translates into the conditional shopper being more and more ‘satisficing’,
which in turn leads to greater profits.
Lemma 2 states that the minimum level of profits that firms can guaran-
tee in this model is equal to α
2
. It is therefore interesting to examine whether
competitive forces drive equilibrium profits to the max-min level or the pres-
ence of satisficing consumers allows firms to earn extra profits. Notice that
15
Figure 3: Profits (Solid Line) vs Max-Min Payoff (Dashed Line)
in equilibrium, when α < 2
3
,
pi((α, 1), σ) = α
(
λ
(
1
2
+
1− F 0(α)
2
)
+
(1− λ)
2
)
Notice also that pi((α, 1), σ) = α
2
if and only if F 0(α) = 1. That is, firms
earn the max-min payoff in equilibrium whenever, conditional on sending out
a low signal, they never charge a price greater than α. However, in equilib-
rium firms do charge prices greater than α conditional on sending out a low
signal if and only if α < 2
3
. This means that the source of extra profits above
the max-min is given by the fact that firms charge with positive probability
prices that are never satisfactory to the conditional shopper, conditional on
sending out a low signal.
4.2 Consumer Search Behaviour and Switching Rate
Corollary 2 (Equilibrium Search and Switching Rate). The equilibrium
probability that only one firm is inspected is
 2α(2+2F 0(β)(2−α)+7α)
(2+3α)2
, if α < 2
3
 α(3 + F 0(β)− α(1 + F 0(β)))− 1, otherwise.
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The equilibrium switching rate is
 4+3(4−5α)α
2(2+3α)2
, if α < 2
3
 3(α−1)2
2
, otherwise.
Figure 4: Probability that One Firm Is Inspected when F 0(β) = 0 (Solid
Line) and F 0(β) = 1 (Dashed Line)
In terms of search behaviour, corollary 2 contains three main messages
(see also figure 4). First, the equilibrium probability that only one firm is
inspected increases with the aspiration levels α and β. That is, the more the
consumer is ‘satisficing’, the less he searches. Second, unlike most models of
consumer search, this model displays equilibrium search.23 Specifically, the
consumer always searches except in the extreme case in which the conditional
shopper becomes uninformed (i.e., α = 1). Third and most importantly,
despite a change in β causes a change in the equilibrium probability that only
23An exception is again the model by Chen and Zhang (2011). Under the conditions
specified previously, their model displays a price distribution with a gap. In that case both
firms set the price above the global searcher’s reservation price with positive probability in
equilibrium. As a result the global searcher may search more than once before purchasing
in equilibrium.
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one firm is inspected, the resulting change in consumer’s search behaviour
does not have any effect on the equilibrium marketing and pricing strategies
(see also figure 5 representing the switching rate). The intuition is as follows.
Figure 5: Switching Rate
Consider the first case of proposition 1 by assuming α < 2
3
.24 Suppose that
a firm i chooses a pure strategy (p, s) = (p˜, 0) with p˜ ∈ [ α
1+α
, α
)
against firm
j choosing the equilibrium strategy σ. Focus the attention on the realization
in which firm j sends out a high signal, which occurs with probability 1− λ,
and the state of the world in which the consumer ’s default firm is firm i.
In this case the consumer is a conditional shopper with an aspiration price
equal to β. Assume first that β ≥ p˜. Firm i’s expected profits are:
pi((p˜, 0), σ) = p˜
(
λ(1− F 0(p˜)) + (1− λ)
(
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
))
(3)
That is, the conditional shopper assigned to firm i finds its price sat-
isfactory, stops searching, and purchases from firm i (second addendum of
equation 3). Assume now that - ceteris paribus - the conditional shopper’s
24The same argument goes through if one assumes instead α ≥ 23 .
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aspiration price β decreases below p˜. This means that the conditional shop-
per assigned to firm i now finds firm i’s price unsatisfactory and therefore
explores firm j. Firm j, however, is more expensive than firm i (it charges α
and 1 with equal probability), so that the consumer goes back to firm i and
purchases from it. Notice that firm i’s expected profits in this second case
are exactly the same as those of equation 3, despite the fact that the con-
sumer’s search behaviour has changed: while in the first case the consumer
has stopped searching at firm i, in the second case he has made a price com-
parison. This result is given by the fact that the consumer is boundedly
rational and does not search optimally by disregarding the equilibrium price
distribution. In particular in the second case the consumer is unable to re-
alize that if he keeps searching, the price that he will discover is worse with
certainty.
This finding can help explain why - despite there have been advancements
in the search technology that have facilitated search, such as the arrival of the
internet - price dispersion has persisted (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000): the
internet has induced consumers to search more actively, but, since a fraction
of consumers do not search optimally, firms have only partially adjusted their
marketing and pricing strategies accordingly.
5 Concluding Discussions
In this section I acknowledge the main limitations of the model and out-
line possible extensions. First, the model assumes for simplicity that, for
a given marketing profile (si, sj), the consumer ’s induced aspiration price
is deterministic. Assume instead that Gi(p; si, sj) denotes a continuous cdf
with support [p, p] such that p ≤ 0 and p ≥ 1 measuring the probability with
which the consumer’s aspiration price is smaller than or equal to p under the
marketing profile (si, sj) when firm i is the default firm. It would be interest-
ing to verify whether the results obtained in this paper extend to this more
general setup. A preliminary observation is that in this extended setting
mixing over prices is required even when the marketing profile is fixed, as
undercutting is always profitable and the max-min payoff is strictly greater
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than zero.25
Second, the satisficing heuristic is characterized by two primitives: (i) the
ordering according to which the products are examined and (ii) an aspiration
price. In this model firms can endogenously manipulate the latter only. A
natural extension would be to consider a more general model in which firms
can affect also the ordering according to which alternatives are examined
and, therefore, which firm is the default firm.
Third, the paper does not derive policy implications of the model. An
interesting exercise would be to study the effects of a standard policy inter-
vention of making the market more competitive. The latter would require
extending the model to n firms.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Assume, by contradiction, that there is an equilibrium in which firms choose
marketing signals deterministically. I distinguish three cases.
Case (i): both firms choose s=0. In this case the consumer is a shopper
and standard Bertrand arguments imply that the unique equilibrium candi-
date is given by both firms charging a zero price, which leads to zero profits.
However, each firm i has an incentive to deviate to (p, s) = (α, 1). The reason
is that at the deviation the consumer’s aspiration price is α (resp., β) in the
25As an illustration, notice that
pii(p, p) = p
(
Gi(p)
2 + (1−Gi(p))
2
+
Gj(p)
2 + 0
2
)
and
pii(p− , p) = (p− )
(
Gi(p− ) + (1−Gi(p− ))
2
+
Gj(p) + 0
2
)
The latter is greater than the former for a sufficiently small . Moreover, charging
zero yields zero, but it is profitable to deviate to a positive price, as it yields at least
p 1−Gi(p)2 > 0.
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state of the world in which the consumer’s default firm is i (resp., j). In the
state of the world in which the default is firm i, the consumer finds firm i’s
price satisfactory. This implies that he does not inspect firm j and buys firm
i’s product. Hence, firm i makes α
2
> 0 profits, a contradiction.
Case (ii): both firms choose s=1. In this case the consumer is unin-
formed. Hence, the unique equilibrium candidate is given by firms charging
a price equal to 1, which yields 1
2
profits. Each firm i can profitably deviate
by reducing the consumer’s aspiration price below 1 (by choosing s = 0) and
charging a price  > 0 smaller than 1. In this way firm i ensures that the con-
sumer finds the price charged by both firms unsatisfactory and buys firm i’s
product with probability one, as it is cheaper. At the deviation firm i makes
1−  profits that are greater than 1
2
for a sufficiently small , a contradiction.
Case (iii): firm i chooses s = 0 and firm j s = 1. Then, in the state
of the world in which the default firm is firm i (resp., j) the consumer’s
aspiration price is β (resp., α). It can be shown that the unique equilibrium
candidate is an asymmetric mixed-strategy profile that depends upon the
distance between α and β. I distinguish two sub-cases.
Sub-case (a): β < α
2
. At the equilibrium candidate firm i randomizes
over the price according to the cdf:
F (p) =

0 if p < α
2
2
(
1− α
2p
)
if p ∈ [α
2
, α
)
1 otherwise
(4)
Firm j, on the other hand, with probability A = 1
2
charges α and with
probability 1−A randomizes over the price according to the cdf of equation
4. Firm i makes α
4
and firm j α
2
profits. Firm i can profitably deviate by
choosing (p, s) = (1, 1). The deviation yields 1
2
> α
4
, a contradiction.
Sub-case (b): β ≥ α
2
. At the equilibrium candidate, firm i with probability
B = 2β−α
β
charges β and with probability 1 − B randomizes over the price
according the cdf:
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F (p) =

0 if p ≤ β
α(p−β)
p(α−β) if p ∈ (β, α)
1 otherwise
(5)
Firm j, instead, with probability A = β
α
charges α and with probability
1−A randomizes according to the cdf of equation 5. Firm i makes β
2
and firm
j makes α
2
profits. Firm j can profitably deviate by choosing (p, s) = (β, 0).
At the deviation firm j makes β > β
2
profits, a contradiction.
B Proof of proposition 1
Let σ denote a symmetric equilibrium (mixed-) strategy. Denote by psL and p
s
H
the infimum and the supremum of the support of F s with s = 0, 1, respectively.
By standard arguments, F 0 is atomless and, by lemma 2, psL > 0 for s = 1, 2. I
prove the statement in a series of steps.
Step 1: p0H ≤ p1H = 1.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that p0H > p
1
H . Suppose first that p
0
H > β.
Then, pi((p0H , 0), σ) = 0, which contradicts lemma 2. Assume that p
0
H ≤ β.
Then, pi((p0H , 0), σ) = p
0
H(1 − λ)12 . However, deviating to (p, s) = (α, 1) yields
pi((α, 1), σ) = α2 (1− λ) > p0H(1− λ)12 , a contradiction. Hence, p0H ≤ p1H .
Next, assume, by contradiction, that p1H < 1. Suppose first that p
1
H > α. Then,
pi((p1H , 1), σ) =
p1H
2 (1 − λ), but then it is profitable to deviate to (p, s) = (1, 1).
Next, assume that p1H < α. Notice that pi((p
1
H , 1), σ) = p
1
H
1
2 , but then it is
profitable to deviate to α. It remains to examine the p1H = α case. Suppose first
that p0H > β. Then, pi((p
0
H , 0), σ) = p
0
H
(
(1− λ)
(
1−F 1(p0H)
2
))
. But deviating to
(p, s) = (p0H , 1) yields pi((p
0
H , 1), σ) =
p0H
2 and is profitable. A similar argument
applies if p0H ≤ β. Hence, p1H = 1.
Step 2: p0L < p
1
L ≤ α.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that p1L > α. Notice that pi((p
1
L, 1), σ) =
p1L
(
λ(1− F 0(p1L)) + (1−λ)2
)
. However, deviating to (p, s) = (p1L, 0) is profitable,
as it yields p1L
(
λ(1− F 0(p1L)) + (1− λ)
)
, which leads to a contradiction. Hence,
p1L ≤ α.
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Next, assume, by contradiction, that p0L ≥ p1L. Notice that pi((p1L, 1), σ) =
p1L
(
λ
(
1
2 +
1−F 0(β)
2
)
+ (1−λ)2
)
. Assume first that F 1 does not have an atom at
p1L. Then, deviating to (p, s) = (p
1
L, 0) yields p
1
L
(
λ+ (1− λ)
(
1
2 +
1−F 1(α)
2
))
and
is profitable, as, by step 1, F 1(α) < 1. Notice that, if F 1 has an atom at p1L,
then (p, s) = (p1L− , 0) constitutes a profitable deviation for a sufficiently small .
Hence, p0L < p
1
L.
Step 3: Either F 0 or F 1 is strictly increasing over the interval
[
p0L, α
)
.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists an interval [p′, p′′] with α >
p′′ > p′ > p0L over which both F
0 and F 1 are flat. By standard arguments, this
cannot be the case, as expected profits of (p′′, s) are greater than expected profits
of (p′, s) against σ.
It remains to show that there cannot be an interval [p′, p′′] with α > p′′ > p′ >
p0L over which both F
0 and F 1 are strictly increasing. Suppose not. Assume first
that p′′ ≤ β. Notice that
pi((p′, 0), σ) = p′
(
λ(1− F 0(p′)) + (1− λ)
(
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
))
pi((p′, 1), σ) = p′
(
λ
(
1
2
+
1− F 0(β)
2
)
+
(1− λ)
2
)
By equating these two and solving for F 1(α),
F 1(α) =
1− λ− 2λF 0(p′) + λF 0(β)
1− λ (6)
Next, notice that
pi((p′′, 0), σ) = p′′
(
λ(1− F 0(p′′)) + (1− λ)
(
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
))
pi((p′′, 1), σ) = p′′
(
λ
(
1
2
+
1− F 0(β)
2
)
+
(1− λ)
2
)
By equating these two and solving for F 1(α), F 1(α) = 1−λ−2λF
0(p′′)+λF 0(β)
1−λ ,
which contradicts equation 6.
A similar argument applies if p′ > β.
Step 4: F 1 has an atom at p1L = α.
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Proof. I first show that p1L = α. Assume, by contradiction, that p
1
L < α. By step
3, either F 0 or F 1 is strictly increasing over the interval [p1L, α). Assume first that
F 1 is strictly increasing over the interval [p1L, α). Since pi((p, 1), σ) is independent
of p in the realization in which the opponent chooses s = 1, then F 0 must be
strictly increasing as well over the same interval. However, this contradicts step 3.
Therefore, F 1 must have an atom at p1L < α and F
0 is strictly increasing over the
interval
[
p0L, α
)
. However, this is impossible as well, as the presence of the atom
makes undercutting profitable conditional on s = 0. Hence, p1L = α.
To prove that F 1 has an atom at α, notice that:
pi((α, 1), σ) = α
(
λ
(
1
2
+
1− F 0(β)
2
)
+
(1− λ)
2
)
pi((α+ , 1), σ) = (α+ )
(
λ
(
1− F 0(α+ ))+ (1− λ)
2
)
Since for a sufficiently small  the former is greater than the latter, then it
must be the case that F 1 has an atom at α.
Step 5: F 0 is flat over the interval (α, pˆ) for some pˆ ∈ (α, 1).
Proof. Notice that
lim
p→−α
pi((p, 0), σ) = α
(
λ(1− F 0(α)) + (1− λ)
(
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
))
pi((α+ , 0), σ) = (α+ )
(
λ(1− F 0(α+ )) + (1− λ) (1− F 1(α+ )))
Notice that the former is greater than the latter for a sufficiently small .
Denote by pˆ the supremum of the interval (α, α+) for which limp→−α pi((p, 0), σ)−
pi((α+ , 0), σ) > 0.
Step 6: F 1 consists of two atoms located at α and 1.
Proof. For similar arguments to step 5, F 1 must be flat over the interval (α,min{pˆ, 1}).
If pˆ ≥ 1, then the result follows immediately. Assume, instead, that pˆ < 1. By the
same arguments of step 3, either F 0 or F 1 is strictly increasing over the interval
(pˆ, 1). If F 1 is strictly increasing, then, by the arguments of step 3, F 0 must be
strictly increasing as well, a contradiction. Hence, F 0 is strictly increasing over
the interval (pˆ, 1), F 1 is flat over the same interval and has an atom at 1, and
p0H = 1, which leads to the desired result.
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Step 7: p0H ∈ {α, 1}.
Proof. I first show that p0H ≥ α. Suppose not. Hence, p0H < α. Then, pi((p0H , 0), σ) =
p0H
(
(1− λ)
(
1
2 +
1−F 1(α)
2
))
, as, by step 4, p1L = α. Assume that a firm deviates
to (p, s) = (α− , 0) for a sufficiently small  > 0. In the limit as  → 0, this
deviation yields α
(
(1− λ)
(
1
2 +
1−F 1(α)
2
))
and is profitable if and only if p0H < α,
which is true by assumption, a contradiction.
Next, suppose, by contradiction, that p0H ∈ (α, 1). By step 6, F 1 is flat over
the interval (α, 1). Note that choosing (p0H , 0) yields p
0
H
(
(1− λ)(1− F 1(α))).
However, deviating to (p, s) = (1− , 0) for a sufficiently small  > 0 is profitable,
as in the limit this strategy yields (1 − λ)(1 − F 1(α)). Hence, it must be that
p0H ∈ {α, 1}.
In the remaining part of the proof I distinguish two cases.
CASE 1: pˆ < 1.
By the arguments of step 3, F 0 is strictly increasing over the interval [pˆ, 1).
Therefore, p0H = 1. This implies that the support of F
0 consists of the disjoint
interval [p0L, α) ∪ [pˆ, 1) and F 1 consists of two atoms located at α and 1. Notice
that
pi((p0L, 0), σ) = p
0
L
(
λ+ (1− λ)
(
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
))
lim
p→−α
pi((p, 0), σ) = α
(
λ(1− F 0(α)) + (1− λ)
(
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
))
pi((α, 1), σ) = α
(
λ
(
1
2
+
1− F 0(α)
2
)
+
(1− λ)
2
)
pi((pˆ, 0), σ) = pˆ
(
λ(1− F 0(α)) + (1− λ)(1− F 1(α)))
lim
p→−1
pi((p, 0), σ) = (1− λ)(1− F 1(α))
pi((1, 1), σ) =
(1− λ)
2
By equating the above equations, I find that λ, p0L, pˆ, F
0(α), and F 1(α) are
defined as in the first case of proposition 1. Notice that p0H > pˆ if and only if
α < 23 . Once that these are obtained, I find that F
0 and F 1 are defined as in
the first case of proposition 1. In the supplementary material (available from the
author upon request) I show that there are no profitable deviations.
CASE 2: pˆ ≥ 1.
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Therefore, p0H = α. Hence, the support of F
0 consists of the interval [p0L, α)
and F 1 consists of two atoms located at α and 1. Notice that
pi((p0L, 0), σ) = p
0
L
(
λ+ (1− λ)
(
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
))
lim
p→−α
pi(p, 0), σ) = α
(
(1− λ)
(
1
2
+
1− F 1(α)
2
))
pi((α, 1), σ) = α
(
λ
(
1
2
)
+
(1− λ)
2
)
pi((1, 1), σ) =
(1− λ)
2
By equating the above equations, I find that λ, p0L, and F
1(α) are defined as in
the second case of proposition 1. Once that these are obtained, I find that F 0 and
F 1 are defined as in the second case of proposition 1. In the supplementary mate-
rial (available from the author upon request) I show that there are no profitable
deviations if and only if α ≥ 23 .
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